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THE FORK IN THE ROAD AFTER STRASBOURG: 
EFFECTIVE REMEDY OR MORAL VICTORY?  
A PROVOCATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DUTY TO ABIDE BY THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
FROM THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
RICCARDO DE CARIA* 
The article deals with the enforcement of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights in domestic systems, and particularly with the advisability of a provision that allows 
the review of a final judgment at domestic level when the Court found that judgment in 
violation of the Convention. The most relevant provision is Article 46 of the Convention. 
After showing how the way Article 46 is construed influences the protection of fundamental 
freedoms (I) , the article focuses specifically on Italy, that  unlike other countries  has never 
provided fo r any form of review of its final judgments in order to comply with Article 46. 
Though recently the courts have started filling this gap in the law (II). 
The thesis is that the only way to comply with Article 46 is to allow a review and an  
immediate suspension o f the enfo rcement o f a ju dgment, with no conditions and for any  
kind of proc eeding, whenever the Court found it was in violation of the Convention (III) . 
Then, the article contrasts the propo sed approach to the bills on the matter pen ding before 
the Italian Parliament (IV), and conclu des by arguing that the proposed legislative reform 
is advisable both for European federa lists and for Eurosceptics (V). 
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Italian Corte Costituzionale are available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ giurisprudenza 
/pronunce/filtro.asp; the bills submitted to the Italian Parliament are available on the Italian 
Senates website, at http://www.senato.it/ricerche/sDDL/ nuova.ricerca. 
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I. THE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DUTY TO ABIDE BY THE FINAL 
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HOW THEY 
REFLECT ON THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN MEMBER 
STATES DOMESTIC SYSTEMS 
If one takes the long view, the process of political integration in Europe 
has achieved very far-reaching results,1 that largely overcome the recent 
standstill.2 Some argue that it has gone way too far, some others that it should 
go much further. It is worth considering, though, that there is at least one  
aspect of the many-sided phenomenon of European integration, that seems to 
meet with the favor also of the former: the role played by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in protecting fundamental freedoms. 
As is well known, the ECtHR was created by the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which was the first 
international legal document to make the protection of fundamental rights 
                                       
1 D. Dinan, Fifty years of European integration: a remarkable achievement, 31 Fordham Intl L.J. 
1118, 1118 (2008). 
2 Due to the failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004 and 
to the delay in ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, finally entered into force on December 
1, 2009. Among many comments to the Treaty of Lisbon, see I. Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: 
Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 349 (2009). 
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enforceable; in order to enforce the rights and freedoms it proclaimed, the 
ECHR established its own set of organs and institutions, including indeed a 
Court judging on the violation of fundamental rights committed by the 
Member States of the Convention. 
With the purpose of making the Courts role truly effective, the ECHR 
also imposed on Member States the duty to abide by the final judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights. In this article, we will focus on this 
duty, provided for by Article 46(1) of the ECHR.3 This provision does not 
specify the content of such obligation, leaving to Member States the decision 
about how to comply with it,4 thus leaving the door open to interpretations 
even very different from one another.  
Therefore, the way this provision is interpreted seriously affects the level 
of protection of individual liberties within the ECHR system: evidently, if this 
duty is understood as requiring Member States to  amend their law when a 
violation found by the ECtHR is systematic (as it depends on a legislative 
provision), and especially to allow the review of a judgment whenever the 
ECtHR finds it in violation of the ECHR, then ECtHR standards will 
invariably have to be applied by Member States, without a possible way of 
escape. Instead, if one holds that the duty to abide by the final judgment of 
the Court only requires the States to pay the petitioners the just satisfaction 
provided for by Article 41, ECHR, when the ECtHR condemns them to pay 
this form of compensation, then the consequences on the domestic systems 
will be far smaller. 
In this work, we will focus on the impact of European judgments on the 
domestic judgments they refer to, leaving out their impact on other judgments 
and on domestic legislation5. The subject has been studied by many scholars, 
                                       
3 For a general comment to this Article, see A. Drzemczewski, Art. 46, in S. Bartole and B. 
Conforti and G. Raimondi (eds.), Commentario alla Convenzione per la Tutela dei Diritti dellUomo 
e delle Libertà Fondamentali (2001) 685. See also a work specifically dealing w ith Art. 46, P. 
Pirrone, LObbligo di Conformarsi Alle Sentenze della Corte Europea dei Diritti dellUomo (2004). 
4 See for example the follow ing ECtHR judgments: Kollcaku v. Italy (No. 25701/03, judgment 
of 8 February 2007, para. 82); Zunic v. Italy (No. 14405/05, judgment of 21 December 2006, 
para. 75); Sannino v. Italy (No. 30961/03, judgment of 27 April 2006, para. 71); Piersack v. 
Belgium (No. 8692/79, judgment of 26 October 1984, para. 12, on the former Art. 50); 
Lyons and Others v. the UK (No. 15227/03, decision of 8 July 2003). 
5 On the first issue, see for example G. Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal Order, 40 Tex. Intl L.J. 359, 374 (2005); 
on the second one, A. Drzemczewski, supra note 3, at 690. 
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especially from the criminal procedure perspective,6 where there seems to be a 
greater need to take the rights to a fair trial (Article 6(3) ECHR) seriously.7 
Keeping these studies in mind, this article will look at the same subject from 
the point of view of constitutional law (with some comparison between the 
Italian and the French approach). We will keep the Italian legal system as a 
primary object of observation (especially in sections 2 and 4), but we believe 
that the conclusion we draw, when we discuss the choice between the two 
possible interpretations mentioned above (sections 3 and 5), can be valid, 
mutatis mutandis, for any other Member State, since it is based on general 
arguments, not specific to the Italian law. 
II. THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE NEW WORDING OF 
ARTICLE 117(1) OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE CASE-LAW OF THE 
CORTE DI CASSAZIONE AND THE CORTE COSTITUZIONALE 
Until recently, Italy has always chosen the latter interpretation between 
the two mentioned in the previous section, i.e. the narrower one. Indeed, 
unlike other countries,8 Italy has never provided for a general mechanism to 
                                       
6 Recently, see for example A. Balsamo and R. E. Kostoris (eds.), Giurisprudenza Europea e 
Processo Penale Italiano: Nuovi Scenari Dopo il Caso Dorigo e gli Interventi della Corte Costituzionale 
(2008). 
7 We are clearly quoting the title of a very famous book: R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(1977). We w ill paraphrase again this fortunate expression, recently used also in an article 
on the dialogue betw een the different European Courts by M. Cartabia, Europe and Rights: 
Taking Dialogue Seriously, 5 European Constitutional Review 5 (2009) . 
8 From T. Barkhuysen-M.L. van Emmerik, A Comparative View on the Execution of Judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights, in T.A. Christou and J. P. Raymond (eds.), European 
Court of Human Rights. Remedies and Execution of Judgments 1, 9 (2005), we draw the following 
list of countries that passed a special law to allow some form of reopening of domestic 
proceedings: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, The Netherlands, while a general 
provision allowing the reopening can be certainly used to reopen proceedings after a judgments 
of the ECtHR in Finland and Sweden. D. Tega, Il seguito delle sentenze di condanna della 
Corte dei diritti di Strasburgo: è nato un quarto grado di giudizio?, available at 
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/nuovi%20pdf/Giurisprudennza 
/Giurisdizioni_Ordinarie/0002_caso_dorigo_tega.pdf, also mentions the Republic of San 
Marino and the United Kingdom in the first group, and, listing the countries that got to allow  a 
reopening through their case-law, adds Denmark, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, and 
Spain. Since 2007, the first group shall also include Portugal. See also V. Sciarabba, La 
riapertura del giudicato in seguito a sentenze della Corte di Strasburgo: profili di comparazione, 11 
Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo 917 (2009).  
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abide by the European Courts decisions. In the last decade, both the courts 
and the literature have repeatedly considered this gap in the law, that many 
authorities deem it necessary to fill as soon as possible.9 
In fact, both the Corte di Cassazione (Italys Supreme Court) and the Corte 
Costituzionale (Italys Constitutional Court) have taken very important steps 
towards the full effectiveness of European judgments, but so far these 
measures have been only partial and incomplete. In two famous cases where 
ECtHR had found two different violations of Article 6 ECHR, the First 
Section of the Corte di Cassazione got to grant respectively a leave to appeal out 
of time to a default defendant to whom the court of appeal had denied this 
request,10 and even a stay against the enforcement of a final judgment.11 
However, this trend is not well-established. In another case, where the 
ECtHR had found a conviction in violation of the Convention, the Court of 
Appeal of Milan12 denied a stay and the reopening of a trial where that 
conviction had been delivered, observing that no rule of Italian law allows the 
enforcing court to interfere with the enforcement of a judgment or the 
imprisonment of a convict, nor to order the reopening of the trial and its 
                                       
9 Within the scholarship, see for example G. Campanelli, La sentenza 129/2008 della Corte 
Costituzionale e il valore delle decisioni della Corte EDU: dalla ragionevole durata alla 
ragionevole revisione del processo, available at http://www.giurcost.org/studi/campa 
nelli.htm. 
See also the Interim Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers on the case Dorigo v. Italy 
(on this case, see infra): ResDH (99) 258 of 15 April 1999, ResDH (2002) 30 of 19 February 
2002, ResDH (2004) 13 of 10 February 2004, and ResDH (2005) 85 of 12 October 2005 
(and also the Final Resolution ResDH (2007) 83). The Committee of Ministers also issued 
tw o Recommendations addressed to all Member States: Nos. R (2000) 2 of 19 January 2000 
and CM/Rec (2008) 2 on efficient domestic capacity for rapid execution of judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights. For a list of all the reports and resolutions on the 
subject adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, see the latest 
Progress Report on the Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (AS/Jur 
(2009) 36), issued on 31 August 2009 by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, 2, note 2, available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2009/ejdoc36 
_2009.pdf. 
10 Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section I, judgment of 3 October 2006, No. 32678 (case 
Somogyi). The judgment by the ECtHR in the case Somogyi v. Italy (No. 67972/01) w as issued 
by the Second Section, and dates back to 18 May 2004.  
11 Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section I, judgment of 1 December 2006  25 January 2007, 
No. 2800 (case Dorigo). The European ruling is Dorigo v. Italy (No. 46520/99, Fourth 
Section, judgment of 13 November 2000). 
12 Corte dAssise dAppello di Milano, judgment of 30 January 2006. 
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repetition according to the fair trial rules.13 The Fifth Section of the 
Cassazione14 rejected the appeal against this judgment, even though on formal 
grounds. 
Then, more recently, still another Section of the Court, the Sixth,15 
allowed a partial exception to the principle of res judicata and a 
reconsideration of the claim, insofar as the Strasbourg ruling was concerned, 
applying by analogy to the case under consideration the remedy provided for 
in Article 625-bis, Code of Criminal Procedure (ricorso straordinario per errore 
materiale o di fatto, extraordinary petition for factual error). 
Furthermore, some decisions stipulated that Italian judges shall not 
refuse to apply internal rules that conflict with the ECHR,16 arguing that the 
idea that the ECHR has become part of the European Union law through 
Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty cannot be accepted.17 
Finally, a very recent judgment by the Fifth Section18 replaced the 
applicants sentence of life imprisonment with a penalty of thirty years 
imprisonment, with the explicit purpose of complying with a previous 
important judgment by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR19, that  pursuant 
to an amendment in the code of criminal procedure that was relevant for the 
case  had considered Italy responsible for «ensuring that the applicants 
sentence of life imprisonment is replaced by a penalty consistent with the 
                                       
13 The ECtHR judgment in this case is F.C.B. v. Italy (No. 12151/86, judgment of 28 
August 1991). The petitioner w as convicted by the Corte dAssise dAppello di Milano, 
judgment of 9 April 1984. 
14 Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section V, judgment of 2 February 2007, No. 4395 (case Cat 
Berro). 
15 Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section VI, judgment of 11 December 2008, No. 45807 (case 
Drassich). The ECtHR judgment was issued on 11 December 2007 (case Drassich v. Italy, 
No. 25575/04). 
16 Corte di Cassazione, decisions of 29 May 2006 and 19 October 2006 (as for the above-
mentioned judgment No. 348 of 2007); Corte di Cassazione, decision 20 May 2006, and Corte 
dAppello di Palermo, decision of 29 June 2006 (as for the above-mentioned judgment No. 
349 of 2007). These decisions occasioned the judgments of the Corte Costituzionale discussed 
below . 
17 This outcome was then confirmed by Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section I, judgment of 
7 January 2008, No. 31, that reaffirmed that the duty to comply w ith the international 
obligations arising from the ECHR is not absolute but always has to be subject to the 
respect of the principles and rules of the constitution. 
18 Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section V, judgment of 28 April 2010, No. 16507. 
19 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) (No. 10249/03, Grand Chamber, judgment of 17 September 2009) 
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principles set out in the present judgment, which is a sentence not exceeding 
thirty years imprisonment» (§ 154). 
As for the Corte Costituzionale, it has marked a historic turning point in the 
effectiveness of the ECHR in the Italian legal system with its judgments of 24 
October 2007, Nos. 348 and 349:20 in these rulings, the Court for the first time 
declared a law unconstitutional because it infringed upon the ECHR, which 
the Court considered to be a norma interposta (interposed standard of review21) 
between other laws and the Constitution. Since the new text of Article 117(1)22 
of the constitution imposes on the state (and the Regions) to comply with 
international obligations, any law that is against the ECHR and its Protocols 
(a major international obligation) is automatically against Article 117(1) and 
then unconstitutional23. 
Less than one year after these rulings, the Corte Costituzionale, in its 
judgment of April 30, 2008, No. 129, explicitly considered the problem of the 
lack of a rule on the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments. The Court said that 
this lack does not violate the provisions of the Italian constitution considered 
in the petition (Articles 3, 10 and 27).24 Though the Court also made clear that 
                                       
20 For a comment in English, see F. Biondi Dal Monte - F. Fontanelli, Decisions No. 348 and 
349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian 
Legal System, 9 German Law Journal 889 (2008), available at http://www.germanlaw 
journal.com/pdf/Vol09No07/PDF_Vol_09_No_07_889-932_Articles_Fontanelli.pdf. See 
also Mirate, The role of the ECHR in the Italian administrative case law . An analysis after 
the two judgments of the Constitutional Court No. 348 and No. 349 of 2007, 1 Italian 
Journal of Public Law  (2009) 260, http://www.ijpl.eu/archive/2009/volume-2/the-role-
of-the-echr-in-the-italian-administrative-case-law .. 
21 In the Italian constitutional jurisprudence, the norme interposte are provisions interposing 
betw een the constitution and an ordinary law. They enforce a constitutional provision, 
therefore, an ordinary law  can never be contrary to a norma interposta, because otherw ise it 
would indirectly violate the constitution. Now that the Corte Costituzionale has said that the 
ECHR is a norma interposta, the ECHR ranks higher than ordinary laws in the hierarchy of 
sources of law ; therefore, ordinary laws will be unconstitutional if they are contrary to the 
ECHR. The translation of norma interposta into interposed standard of review  is the one 
adopted for example by F. Biondi Dal Monte-F. Fontanelli, supra note 20. 
22 Art. 117 was completely rew ritten by Art. 3 of Constitutional Law 18 October 2001, No. 3. 
23 This core statement by judgments Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007 was reaffirmed by 
judgments 26 November 2009, No. 311, and 4 December 2009, No. 317. 
24 V. Sciarabba, Il problema dellintangibilità del giudicato tra Corte di Strasburgo, giudici comuni, Corte 
costituzionale elegislatore?, available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories 
/pdf/documenti_forum/giurisprudenza/2008/0004_nota_129_2008_sciarabba.pdf; Manto-
vani, La sent. n. 129 del 2008 e la riparazione delle violazioni dellart. 6 Cedu, 53 
Giurisprudenza costituzionale 2679 (2008) 2679. 
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if the Parliament does not intervene, and the same question is raised again 
before the Court under the new Article 117(1) (no longer under Articles 3, 10 
or 27), the result would likely be different.25 
To sum up, the picture of the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments in Italy  
remains contradictory: notwithstanding some very significant case-law 
innovations, that are probably sufficient to allow us to say that the Italian  
system is no longer completely lacking in remedies, there is still some 
resistance to an automatic full enforcement of ECtHR judgments, mainly due 
to the fact that judges deem it impossible to achieve this result without a 
legislative intervention.26 
We will now move to consider what this legislative intervention should 
provide for. Before that, it still has to be underlined that Article 46 ECHR 
must be read and interpreted together with Article 41, which reads: If the 
Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows 
only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just 
satisfaction to the injured party. Also Article 13 has to be considered, 
according to which Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority  . 
On the whole, these provisions imply that, when the Court finds a 
violation of the Convention by a Member State, in principle it is that State  
that, through its internal law, shall grant the individual an effective remedy 
that allows the State to remedy the violation, thus abid[ing] by the final 
judgment of the Court. Only subject to the failure by the State law to afford 
full redress, the Court, if necessary, can afford just satisfaction: but the priority 
is given to the domestic remedy.27 Such remedy must necessarily be more 
effective than merely the award of damages; it must, if possible, put the 
                                       
25 Actually, in the same trial that led to judgment No. 129 of 2008 of the Corte Costituzionale 
(the Dorigo controversy), the Court of Appeal of Bologna has raised a new question of 
legitimacy (decision of 23 December 2008), this time referring to Art. 117(1). But currently, 
the question is not even pending yet before the Corte Costituzionale, so it is still going to take 
time before the new judgment on the case by the Corte Costituzionale comes up [last checked 
18 June 2010]. 
26 To be sure, there have been some limited innovations by the legislature, about which see 
M. Salvadori, Convenzione europea dei diritti delluomo e ordinamento italiano, 2 Diritto e Politiche 
dellUnione Europea 128, 138 (2008). 
27 B. Randazzo, Giudici comuni e Corte europea dei diritti, in P. Falzea and A. Spadaro and L. 
Ventura (eds.), La Corte Costituzionale e le Corti dEuropa 217, 235 (2003). 
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individual in the exact position he would be without the violation (restitutio in 
integrum28): otherwise, there would have been no reason for the drafters to 
provide for this double level, when they could have just provided for a 
monetary recovery in any situation, and not just on a subordinate level like 
they did29. 
But given that abiding by the final judgment of the ECtHR means 
affording individuals something more than mere monetary indemnification, 
how far goes this something more? Now comes a choice between a zero-option 
(the one chosen so far by Italy, where the domestic judgment remains in force 
with its res judicata effect, even if it is found to be tainted by a violation of the 
Convention) and an extreme one, which is the central question of this article. 
As for the countries that have complied with the duty provided for by Article 
46 ECHR, their solutions can all be considered intermediate between the 
former and the latter. These countries have adopted a combination of the two 
main remedies that can be imagined here: the suspension of the enforcement 
of the relevant domestic judgment and some form of reopening of the trial 
that brought to that judgment. 
                                       
28 See Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights  3rd annual report 2009 (issued in April 2010), 18 available at www.coe.int. See 
also the ECtHR judgment Stoichkov v. Bulgaria (No. 9808/02, 24 March 2005), where the 
Court found in violation of Art. 5 (1), ECHR the imprisonment of a person to enforce a 
judgment that the Court had found tainted by a violation of the Convention. See also the 
partly dissenting opinion of Judge Zupančič in Cable and Others v. United Kingdom (Nos. 
24436/94 and others, judgment of 18 February 1999), according to w hich the national 
legislation ought to provide for retrial of cases in which the proceedings have been found 
not to comply w ith essential procedural requirements. That, I think, is the purpose of the 
Article 41 words referring to the reparation allowed by internal law. 
It must be taken into account, though, that so far the ECtHR has not been prepared to 
deal separately w ith the complaint that a previous Court judgment has not been (properly) 
executed (T. Barkhuysen-M.L. van Emmerik, supra note 8, at 21: the Authors refer in 
particular to the relatively old case Olsson v. Sweden (No. II), No. 13441/87, 27 November 
1992, where the applicants asked the Court to condemn Sweden for a violation of Article 
46, which the Court refused.) For some criticism towards the judgments w here the Court 
seems to order the liable State to afford the restitutio in integrum, see P. Pirrone, supra note 
3, at 70. 
29 The view that compensation is an insufficient remedy as a general rule, was embraced by 
the very recent ruling of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) 
(mentioning in this sense, among many other authorities, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], 
Nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249  and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], No. 71503/01, § 198 
 ). The case w as about a failure by Sw itzerland to enforce a previous judgment of the 
Second Section of the Court, of 28 June 2001, VgT v. Switzerland, No. 24699/94. 
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To conclude, the different variables that can be combined in order to 
give more or less effectiveness to ECtHRs judgments are the following: (a) 
requirements for suspension or reopening of domestic judgments (any 
violation or just the ones deemed most serious); (b) judges afford these 
measures with discretion or they are obliged to afford them automatically 
when the state is found in violation of the ECHR; (c) possible consequences 
of suspension and reopening (all the effects of the judgment can be nullified, 
or only some; a new trial may be ordered or the proceedings may be deemed 
concluded by the decision of the Strasbourg court); (d) remedies are afforded 
only for criminal trials, or also for civil and administrative proceedings. 
III. EXTREME OPTION: ACADEMIC EXERCISE OR LIKELY FUTURE? 
Without considering all the different possible combinations of these 
variables, let us focus on the maximum solution. This option is seldom 
considered, because at first sight it seems to be very unlikely to be put into 
effect, at least in the near future. It would consist in a rule like the following: 
any time the ECtHR finds any violation of the ECHR, committed in a domestic 
trial or proceeding of any kind (criminal, civil, or administrative), states shall  
automatically suspend the enforcement and all the effects of the judgment 
issued at the end of that proceeding, and allow without condition the reopening 
of that proceeding before a domestic court or other appropriate tribunal. 
At first sight this option appears extreme. Nevertheless, there are enough 
arguments to conclude that it could be the best possible choice. The following 
considerations will explain why moving towards it is appropriate, and 
probably also inevitable in the long run. Therefore, it would be better if the 
Italian legislature, when choosing among the different available options, 
ranging from the minimum to the maximum solution, decided to adhere as 
closely as possible to the latter. 
Certainly the original system created by the Convention did not provide 
for such an ambitious role for the ECtHR. Until Protocol No. 11 came into 
force (in 1998), the Court could not even be directly seized by individuals: its 
jurisdiction was filtered by the Commission of Human Rights. However, 
especially in recent years, also due to the innovations introduced by Protocol 
No. 11, the ECtHR has started to have an increasingly important influence on 
Member States legal systems, sometimes even urging them to make, or 
imposing on them, changes in their legislation.30 The Court of Strasbourg has 
                                       
30 As for Italy, the best known example is Law 24 March 2001, No. 89 (so called legge Pinto), 
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thus now acquired a central position for the protection of fundamental rights, 
assuming functions typical of a constitutional court as well as of a court of last 
resort.31 
The main objections to the maximum solution can be traced to the 
following three: (a) not all violations are equal: some are less serious, therefore 
completely quashing a trial in any case of a violation seems to be too drastic; 
(b) the extreme solution would infringe on the principle of res judicata; (c) the  
approach of the Strasbourg Court is different from that of national courts: 
indeed, its judgments usually employ a fuzzy logic,32 so they cannot be treated 
like those of a court of last resort of a Member State. Let us consider each of 
these arguments in order. 
(a) The first objection explains the choice of affording remedies only for 
criminal judgments, and not for civil and administrative ones. Most European 
countries have made this choice.33 The best example is France,34 whose 
approach we now consider briefly: pursuant to an amendment introduced by 
Law June 15, 2000, No. 516, the French code of criminal procedure now 
allows (Articles 626-1 et seq.) the reexamining of a final criminal judgment, if a 
ruling by the ECtHR found that judgment violated the ECHR or a Protocol 
                                                                                                                  
concerning the reasonable length of the proceedings. 
31 Indeed some authors have started wondering whether a fourth level of judgment may be 
born: see D. Tega, supra note 8. By the same author, see also D. Tega, Il sistema di 
protezione Cedu dei diritti e lordinamento italiano, in M. Cartabia (ed.), I diritti in azione. 
Universalità e pluralismo dei diritti fondamentali nelle Corti europee 67 (2007) . 
32 This argument is made for example by S. Allegrezza, Violazione della CEDU e giudicato 
penale. Quali contaminazioni? Quali rimedi?, in R. Bin et al. (eds.), AllIncrocio tra 
Costituzione e CEDU: il Rango delle Norme della Convenzione e lEfficacia Interna delle Sentenze di 
Strasburgo 21, 25 (2007). 
33 D. Tega, supra note 8, mentions four States that allow the reopening also of civil and 
administrative proceedings: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Norway and Sw itzerland. Barkhuysen and 
van Emmerik, supra note 8, at 9, also add Malta, that like Sw itzerland introduced a special 
all-embracing provision, valid for all sorts of judgments (criminal, civil and administrative). 
Also Germany and Portugal shall be now included in the list, after some reforms that took 
place respectively in 2006 and 2007. About Germany, see two recent articles published in 
the German Law  Journal (and also available on its website, www.germanlaw journal.com): 
C. Tomuschat, The Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights According to the 
German Constitutional Court, 11 GLJ 513 (2010), and C. Coors, Headwind from Europe: 
The New Position of the German Courts on Personality Rights after the Judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 11 GLJ 527 (2010). 
34 On the French regime, see M.A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of 
International Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 Me. L. Rev. 
404, 440 (note 193) (2006). See also D. Tega, supra note 8. 
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to it; review is afforded when the violation found is of such a nature and 
gravity that the equitable satisfaction afforded on the grounds of Article 41 of 
the Convention would not terminate its damaging consequences. 
Review can be requested, within a year from the date of the ECtHRs 
judgment, by the Minister of Justice, the Procureur Général (Attorney General) 
of the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), or the person convicted (or his 
delegate or heirs); the request shall be addressed to a special committee of 
seven judges of the Cour de Cassation. The committee, if they consider the request 
well-grounded (thus not automatically), may refer the question either to the Cour 
de Cassation or to a judge on the same level of the judicial hierarchy as the one 
that issued the sentence considered unfair by the ECtHR. At any given 
moment, both the committee and the Cour de Cassation may (so it is a 
discretionary decision) suspend the enforcement of the sentence. 
The choice of limiting the remedies to the criminal sphere is based on 
the fact that in this field we are dealing with habeas corpus and individual 
liberty, therefore it is necessary to afford the maximum level of protection. 
Apparently, this is a self-evident observation: the protection of individual 
liberty must certainly be a primary concern. However, this does not mean that 
the protection of other rights can be disregarded. Indeed there are other 
fundamental rights that are frequently called into question in civil and 
administrative proceedings: such as, the right to property, the right of privacy, 
the right to family life, the right not to be discriminated against, or the right to 
vote. These rights enjoy full protection both by the ECHR and the Italian  
constitution,35 therefore to consider them inferior to individual liberty, no 
matter how fundamental individual liberty is, would be an unfair difference in 
treatment, contrary to reasonableness test. 
Therefore the most appropriate approach would be to afford the 
broadest effect within the domestic jurisdictions to European judgments, 
without distinction between criminal, civil or administrative proceedings (this 
view was confirmed by VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2), No. 32772/02, judgment of 
June 30, 2009 by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR). 
                                       
35 Respectively: the right to property, in Art. 42, Italian Constitution and Art. 1, Protocol 
No. 1 to the ECHR; the right of privacy, in the general clause of Art. 2, Italian Constitution 
(or in Articles 14 and 15, according to a different construction), and Art. 8, ECHR; the 
right to family life, in Art. 29, Italian Constitution, and Art. 8, ECHR; the right not to be 
discriminated against, in Art. 3, Italian Constitution, and Art. 14 ECHR; the right to vote, 
in Art. 48, Italian Constitution, and Art. 3, Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. 
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The idea that it is possible to rank violations, from the most to the least 
serious, is used also to make a distinction within the different sorts of defects 
that can affect a criminal judgment. In particular, some authors36 have argued 
that not all violations found by the ECtHR should lead to a reopening of the 
trial, but only the most serious ones (basically, violations of the right to 
defense): other violations should never (basically, excessive length of the 
proceeding or violation of the right to a public trial), and a third group 
(basically, tainted evidence), only if they significantly affected the outcome of 
the judgment, which has to be ascertained case by case. 
Leaving out the second group37, as for the third one a distinguished 
scholarship has dispelled a common misunderstanding: it is an error of logic 
to distinguish among evidence that is more or less decisive for a conviction. 
Either some evidence is decisive, or it is not, but tertium non datur. In other 
words, it does not exist any evidence that partially affects the outcome of a 
judgment.38 But if the category of partial evidence fades, so does the need for 
a case-by-case distinction based on how much the tainted evidence influenced 
the outcome of the judgment. Therefore, if the Court finds some tainted 
evidence irrelevant for the outcome of the judgment it is reviewing, it shall 
rule that there was no violation of the ECHR. In any other case, the violation 
exists, so we must adopt some domestic measures to remedy the violation 
with no exception, and these measures must include a retrial or reopening or 
review of the proceeding.39 
(b) The second argument for excluding the automatic effectiveness of 
ECtHR judgments is that it would imply a systematic exception to the 
principle of res judicata: this would be unacceptable because of the legal 
uncertainty it would engender. The choice is between maintaining in effect a 
tainted decision, for the sake of a principle that, no matter how fundamental, 
already has a number of exceptions,40 and removing the unfair effects of that 
sentence, in order to effectively protect fundamental rights. 
                                       
36 Among others, see S. Allegrezza, supra note 32. 
37 Yet both the violation of the right to a public trial and the excessive length of a 
proceeding could actually influence the outcome of a decision. 
38 P. Ferrua, Il Giusto Processo 127, 128 (2005). 
39 See the VgT No. 2 judgment, supra note 29, that mentions, among other authorities, 
Gençel v. Turkey, No. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003; Öcalan , [No. 46221/99], § 210; and 
Claes and Others v. Belgium, Nos. 46825/99, 47132/99, 47502/99, 49010/99, 49104/99, 
49195/99 and 49716/99, § 53, 2 June 2005. 
40 In Italy, when a final conviction is based on a law that is later declared unconstitutional, 
Law  11 March 1953, No. 87, Art. 30(4) stipulates that all the effects and the enforcement 
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The principle of res judicata is certainly essential for legal certainty, which 
cannot be sacrificed. However, certainty is adequately protected when 
everybody knows that a petition to Strasbourg can have such a consequence, 
and providing for that in a law would be enough to dispel all doubts. 
Moreover, legal certainty seems to be better protected by a clear and generally 
applicable rule, if drastic, like the one considered, than by a case-by-case  
distinction, maybe sometimes more equitable in the outcome but certainly not 
granting legal certainty, like what we have now, with courts providing for 
exceptions on a case-by-case basis without a clear underlying rationale. 
Maybe this conclusion appears too drastic when we deal with minor 
violations, because it increases the risk of quashing, with no exception 
allowed, even very important judgments because of trivial violations. 
However, it is necessary to reconsider what is deemed to be a trivial violation, 
and there is also the need to take seriously many procedural rights, and thus 
to acknowledge that the violation of apparently minor rights can invalidate the 
whole trial and the decision. 
After all, some authors have correctly argued that it is the ECHR system 
itself that requires the putting aside of the principle of res judicata: the fact that 
the Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted (the fundamental rule of Article 35 ECHR) necessarily implies that 
it considers only judgments that are final in the domestic jurisdiction.41 
To be sure, these remarks inevitably lead to an even more radical 
conclusion: the reopening of the trial and the suspension should be afforded 
not only in case of procedural violations, but also when the violation arises 
from the result of a domestic decision, per se fair from the formal point of 
view (with respect to the violations provided for by Article 6(3), ECHR), but 
unfair from the substantive point of view, that is to say, on the merits. 
                                                                                                                  
of the judgment are suspended, no matter if it is final.  The Corte di Cassazione (supra note 15, 
case Drassich) also stated that w hen it comes to the point of striking a balance between the 
tw o constitutional values of res judicata, on the one hand, and of fair trial,  on the other , 
it is necessary that the latter prevail. The principle of res judicata has been considered 
subject to exceptions also within the EU system (Case 119/05, Lucchini [GC], [2007] ECR 
I-6199; very recently, Case 2/08, Fallimento Olimpiclub, [2009] ECR I-00000). To date, as w as 
said, the Italian Constitutional Court considers the EU and the ECHR systems substantially 
different, so this conclusion cannot be extended to ECtHR judgments, though it is 
important that the ECJ accepts the possibility of putting aside the principle of res judicata 
when that is necessary to meet what the Italian constitution calls international obligations. 
41 E. Lupo, La vincolatività delle sentenze della Corte europea per il giudice interno e la svolta recente 
della Cassazione civile e penale, available at http://appinter.csm.it/incontri/relaz/14037.pdf. 
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Otherwise, protection of fundamental rights will never be really effective and 
serious.  
(c) The last argument is that, since the ECtHR and domestic judges work 
with different logical categories, it is simply impossible to consider the former 
as a higher judge in the same hierarchy, because each still belongs to a separate 
legal system. 
It is undeniable that the Strasbourg Court traditionally uses a fuzzy 
logic:42 the ECtHR doesnt apply the classic alternative of binary logic used by 
domestic judges, guilty/not guilty, but assesses the overall behavior of the State  
in a certain situation, considering different aspects, according to the 
fundamental principle of proportionality. ECtHR doesnt say black or white 
(illegitimate/legitimate behavior), but typically paints in shades of gray (violation or 
non-violation in-this-case-but). 
Another difficulty is that the Italian Corte Costituzionale has traditionally 
adhered to the dualist theory of the relationship between the domestic system 
and the ECHR, confirmed in judgments Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007.43 
However, the more recent trend described above, both on the legislative and 
the judicial side (involving both the Corte di Cassazione and the Corte 
Costituzionale) raises the possibility that this traditional view will soon be 
overruled. Anyway, now that the ECHR ranks higher than the law in the 
Italian hierarchy of sources of law (see again judgments Nos. 348 and 349 of 
2007), meeting the obligations that the ECHR imposes on Italy is no longer 
avoidable, including the duty to abide by the Courts judgments. 
But there is another reason why Italy (together with the other reluctant 
countries) should arguably change its present approach to ECtHR judgments, 
that is the need to assure the general consistency of its legal system as much as 
possible. Even if the domestic and the ECHR systems remain formally 
separate from a theoretical point of view, the demand for straightforward 
laws, as accessible as possible to the man in the street, must also be 
considered. Recent experience in the EU system has repeatedly shown that 
integration faces serious obstacles if the man in the street views European 
institutions as remote and difficult to understand. Therefore, if one wants to 
                                       
42 Vogliotti, La logica floue della Corte Europea dei diritti delluomo tra tutela del testimone 
e salvaguardia del contraddittorio: il caso delle testimonianze anonime, 149 
Giurisprudenza italiana 851 (1997). 
43 The Court had opened to a higher ranking of the ECHR than the law in its judgment of 
19 January 1993, No. 10, but that ruling was not followed by others. 
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promote integration, it is necessary to make them as close and understandable 
as possible to the citizens. 
The same is valid within the ECHR system: a system that proclaims the 
Strasbourg Court to be the highest level of protection of fundamental rights, 
but then does not help in real terms the individual whose claim that Court has 
accepted, will convey to her the idea that the European remedy is in fact a 
blunt, ineffective remedy, only able to afford her a moral victory but not to 
affect what was ruled by the domestic judge.44 And this also brings a serious 
danger: that that individual believes the European remedy falls short of the 
expectations it had given rise to. 
Indeed, it is hardly satisfying for her winning a case in Strasbourg 
(thereby seeing it acknowledged by the Court that, e.g., her detention was (is) 
unlawful, that the expropriation of her land was against the law, or that she 
was unlawfully discriminated against because of her gender, or race or religion 
and so forth), yet realizing then that this acknowledgement does not have the 
automatic result of finally granting her the right the Court said she was 
entitled to. 
After all, it is not by coincidence that the Convention provides for 
monetary satisfaction only on a contingent basis, preferring to impose on 
Member States the obligation to afford an individual the very right the Court 
found her entitled to. Compensation (by the way usually moderate45) does not 
                                       
44 This risk worsens the already limited impact that the ECHR has had on the Italian 
system of civil and political freedoms: this has been due to a different set of reasons, 
thoroughly studied by A. Pace, La limitata incidenza della C.E.D.U. sulle libertà politiche e civili 
in Italia, 7 Diritto Pubblico 1, 10 (2001). See also M. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 
Conn. J. Intl L. 39, 39 (2000): we should be a little more careful about claiming too much 
success for the system. For an international legal system, Strasbourg law  is, from what we 
can tell, remarkably efficacious, but it is far from (anything but relatively) perfect. 
45 M. Janis and R. Kay and A. Bradley, European Human Rights Law. Text and Materials 99, 
100 (2008). The authors also recall that [h]esitatingly, the Court has begun to issue 
remedies beyond declaratory relief and just satisfaction  . [F]or example, in 
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece [No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995] the Court ordered Greece to 
restitute expropriated property or to pay the applicants the propertys current market 
value. On non-monetary measures ordered by the Court, see also Colandrea, On the Power 
of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: Some 
Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases, 7 Human Rights Law Review 
(2007) 396. Together w ith Papamichalopoulos, Ress, supra note 5, at 372-373 recalls the 
follow ing other cases: Alfatli v. Turkey (No. 32985/96, 30 October 2003; Maestri v. Italy, No. 
39748/98, 17 February 2004; Assanidze v. Georgia (No. 71503/01, 8 April 2004); Ilaşcu v. 
Moldova and Russia (No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004); Broniowski v. Poland (No. 31443/96, 22 June 
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give her back his freedom46; it does not clean up her criminal record; it does 
not give her back the property she was unlawfully dispossessed of; nor does it 
give her the job she is entitled to; and so forth. To be sure, that compensation 
is not a sufficient remedy is also proved by the fact that often petitioners do 
not even request it, even if they should be entitled to it if they win the case. 
Things may be different for example in the case of a violation of a single 
individuals right to vote, because in that case a restitutio in integrum, namely the 
repetition of an election, would damage a huge number of blameless voters 
and infringe upon the need for certainty, particularly critical in the electoral 
outcomes. But in all the other examples, none of these downsides applies: no 
blameless or anyway unprepared person would be involved, even in civil 
judgments, because everyone should know that the ECtHR could overturn a 
judgment if it finds it in violation of the Convention; and legal certainty would 
not be really violated, and in fact an approach like the one proposed here 
would have the benefit of the clarity afforded by any automatic mechanism. 
Which by the way suggests that the best way to deal with the issue is via 
legislative intervention: entrusting this task to the courts would increase 
litigation, because every individual who won a case in Strasbourg would have 
to bring a new suit to get Italy to abide by the European judgment, although 
every time the outcome would be uncertain.47 And anyway without legislative 
authorization that judgment would remain in limbo, unenforceable but still 
existing in the legal system: this is not a desirable scenario.48 
Finally, it is true that the approach advocated for here would cost money 
to reorganize the judicial system, and also protract the length of the overall 
proceeding. Yet the extra money spent would be worth it in order to protect 
fundamental rights seriously, and would also be offset by the money saved on 
Article 41 compensations.49 As for the increased duration of proceedings, the 
                                                                                                                  
2004). 
46 Actually, there is a leftover remedy in case of detention, that is the pardon granted by the 
President of the Republic (Art. 87(11) of the Italian constitution): but it is an exceptional 
measure and there is no obligation on the President to afford it, so it is not possible to rely 
on it as a sufficient and effective remedy for our purposes. 
47 Indeed the ECtHR clearly does not have jurisdiction to order domestic courts measures 
like reopening or review  (see, among other authorities, the recent VgT No. 2 judgment, 
mentioned supra, note 29; Saïdi v. France, 20 September 1993, § 47; Pelladoah v. the 
Netherlands, 22 September 1994, § 44). 
48 It is just what happened in the mentioned case Dorigo, pursuant to the above-mentioned 
judgment of the Corte di Cassazione No. 2800 of 2007. 
49 Restitutio in integrum is alternative to monetary compensation, therefore allow ing a 
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provision for effective remedies cannot be influenced by the incapacity of a 
state to have an efficient and quick system of adjudication.50 
In summary, the feeling is that until the Parliament does not bind itself 
to systematically enforce Strasbourg judgments, like it would with a law like 
the one proposed in this article, it will always resist enforcing them in 
individual cases, often choosing to (literally) pay the penalty for violations of 
European law, rather than conforming to the requested standards. If a 
judgment were automatically quashed after a finding of a violation by the 
Strasbourg Court, Italy (and any other country) would lose a major incentive 
to maintaining the illegitimate status quo. 
Briefly, the argument proposed, that at first sight can appear to be far-
fetched, seems to be the one that can better, more seriously, fulfill Italys  
international obligations arising from ECHR membership. Anyway, even 
though one might not want to accept a solution so oriented in favor of 
European integration, considering the inroads that it makes on the sovereignty 
of the Member States, let alone hold it to be imposed by the Italian constitution, 
the thesis assumed here should be at least included in the list of the solutions 
already allowed by the Italian constitution, besides being the likely final stage of 
the relationship between the Italian and the ECHR legal systems. 
IV. THE BILLS PENDING BEFORE THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: A STEP 
FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACKWARD 
So quid juris? We now move briefly to the bills currently pending before 
the Italian Parliament, aimed at complying with a duty that Italy will not be 
able to ignore much longer. 
Like in the previous sessions, also in the current one, the 16th, several 
bills have been submitted to the Parliament with this purpose: in particular, 
two bills have been presented to the Senate (S-839, and S-1156, the latter was 
                                                                                                                  
systematic reopening w ould let the states save the considerable amount money they 
currently give to the individuals as the only contemplated restoration. 
50 A different issue is that this solution would also create a great incentive for individuals to 
file a complaint in Strasbourg, thus overloading even more an already overloaded Court, 
w ith the risk of its collapse. Some precautions would definitely need to be found in order 
to dispel this serious threat. Innovations contained in Protocol No. 14-bis, entered into 
force on 1 October 2009, could be helpful: after Protocol No. 14-bis, a single judge can 
now  reject plainly inadmissible applications, and a three judge committee may now  declare 
applications admissible and decide on their merits in clearly w ell-founded and in repetitive 
cases. 
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then withdrawn), and three at the Chamber of Deputies (C-1538, C-1780, and  
C-2163). Moreover, in another bill (S-1440), proposing a comprehensive 
amendment of several provisions of the code of criminal procedure, two 
articles (9 and 33) deal with exactly the same issue. The latter bill is by far the 
most likely to be passed into law, since it was submitted by the Minister of 
Justice. All the bills go down a very different path from the one described in 
this article as preferable, even though it is to their credit that they deal with 
the matter at all, offering a significant starting point for discussion. 
The strongest argument against the pending bills is the choice they all 
make to allow a review only for criminal judgments, and only for the formal 
violations of Article 6(3) ECHR (not for violations on the merits). Another 
source of perplexity is that most of the bills subject the review to further 
conditions, such as the decisive impact on the outcome of the trial that the 
violation must have in order for the judgment to be reviewed, and the 
condition of imprisonment in which the petitioner must be: these conditions 
make it more difficult to exercise an option that should instead be encouraged 
as much as possible. Furthermore, the second one unreasonably overlooks 
those subject to a measure of diversion. This choice is made with the 
understandable purpose of affording a higher protection in a case considered 
more sensitive, namely when a person is imprisoned, but it ends up treating 
more favorably a person guilty of a presumably more serious crime, 
considering he was imprisoned, than the person guilty of a less serious crime, 
for whom a lesser alternative to detention was considered sufficient. This 
arguably runs counter not only to the principle of equality (Article 3 of the 
constitution), but also to the necessary re-educational purpose of punishments 
(Article 27(3) of the constitution.) 
Doubts are also raised by the choice of two bills not to allow the 
suspension of the effects of the sentence, and in general of all the bills to 
ignore totally the other effects of the conviction, different from the 
punishment itself, such as the inclusion of the conviction in the criminal 
records, the effects on subsequent punishment in case of a relapse into crime, 
and so forth, that cannot be overlooked. In this case, too, there would be little 
benefit of winning the case in Strasbourg, if one cannot remove all the effects 
of the relevant domestic judgment, thus having a contradictory outcome: 
satisfaction for a sentence found unfair, but at the same time preservation of 
that sentence and its effects. 
Moreover, even the three bills that provide for a suspension of the 
judgment, take into consideration only the detention, and make the 
suspension subject to the assessment, on a case-by-case analysis, that an  
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unlawful detention could result. Also in this case, there would be a disparity 
of treatment with somebody whose conviction is struck down by the court of 
appeal or the Corte di Cassazione (with remand). Indeed in these cases the code 
of criminal procedure prescribes, with no exception, the release of the 
defendant if he was imprisoned pursuant to a precautionary measure (Article 
300(1)), while in the bills examined not only is release discretionary and not 
automatic nor immediate, but precautionary measures may even be adopted ex 
novo. Even if such measures would be based on a reasonable and 
understandable need, their employment would seriously risk compromising 
compliance with the European judgment. 
To conclude, there is one last question: are the choices made by these 
bills just less effective in granting the domestic enforcement of ECtHR 
judgments, but good enough to meet the duty to abide by them, or instead 
do they fall short of the minimum threshold of protection? If the answer is 
the latter, in case one of those bills were signed into law with no substantial 
amendment, that law would be against Article 46 ECHR, and therefore, after 
judgments Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007, automatically unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FOR A RACE-TO-THE-TOP IN THE PROTECTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, IN THE POST-LISBON TREATY ERA 
In any case, even if one does not want to accept the suggested solution, 
it is very important that the legislature carefully considers the different options 
it has in order to comply with the duty provided for by Article 46 ECHR. It is  
also a good chance to promote the process of European integration in an area 
where it seems to be able bring many advantages. Indeed, a solution like the 
one suggested here would allow the ECtHR to play the leading role as a 
guardian of fundamental rights that is due to it, but that it has not been able to 
play at its full potential, also because of the lack of a mechanism like the one 
described in this article.51 A Court finally at its full potential would raise on its 
turn the standards that all EU Members have to meet in the protection of the 
fundamental rights afforded by the ECHR. 
On the contrary, if the amendments are too narrow, the ECtHR could 
find them insufficient. As far as Italy is concerned, the Corte Costituzionale 
would probably have then to engage in an activist jurisprudence to fill the 
gaps in protection left by the Parliament (after all, it is what has happened so 
far). 
                                       
51 To be sure, this gap couples w ith other reasons: see Pace, supra note 44. 
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But most of all, an intervention by the Parliament to grant full 
effectiveness to ECtHR judgments seems necessary to make sure that it is 
really worth it, for the Italian nationals (but again, this conclusion is valid for 
any other States nationals), to take on the burdens of a petition to the 
Strasbourg Court, and to make sure they do not estimate those burdens 
superior to the benefit they could gain. 
Indeed, independent of what one thinks of European integration, it 
seems necessary to consider that today the Court of Strasbourg is the 
European court that can better protect fundamental rights (at least those it 
provides for). In other words, the road to an effective and serious protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe starts from individual States and necessarily 
passes through Strasbourg, but that cannot be the last stop: in order for the 
road to be completed, it is necessary to go back to the individual states, and 
fully accomplish what was held in Strasbourg. 
Those who are in favor of fostering European integration could find 
some supporting arguments in The Federalist Papers, a classic of the American 
political thought. Many of the issues and problems discussed there in the 
context of the American debate over the adoption of the federal constitution 
are relevant to todays Europe. 
But even though one has a more Jeffersonian attitude, and mistrusts the 
growth of federal power, both in the US and in the EU, this passage from 
Federalist No. 21 by Hamilton is probably worth considering: The most 
palpable defect of the existing confederation, is the total want of 
a SANCTION to its laws.52 In Federalist No. 22, he also added: Laws are a 
dead letter, without courts to expound and define their true meaning and 
operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be  
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects 
individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. 
To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in 
the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.53 
In fact, both the EU and the ECHR system do have their own supreme 
judicial bodies, and their impact on the law of Member States is ever 
increasing. Nonetheless, Hamiltons warnings indirectly draw our attention to 
the problem we have dealt with in this article. Hamilton did not specifically 
dwell upon the importance of a uniform enforcement of judgments. 
                                       
52 A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 21, in A. Hamilton and J. Jay and J. Madison, The 
Federalist (J. R. Pole ed.) 110 (2005). 
53 A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 22, supra note 52, at 121. 
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Evidently, he must have seen it as obvious, implicit in his call for a uniform 
judiciary. Indeed a uniform judiciary cannot come without a similar uniformity 
and effectiveness in the enforcement of judgments. After all, laws are a dead  
letter, without courts, but courts are a dead letter as well, without a proper 
enforcement of their dictates. 
In response to that, one could argue that Hamilton was describing a 
federal government, which Europe is not, and actually several people, among 
intellectuals and ordinary people, oppose its evolution into a federal 
organization. But an innovation like the one considered here should not worry 
them: indeed the ECtHR only works one-way, namely against Member States, 
thus allowing only an increase in the level of respect of citizens fundamental 
freedoms by Member States, and never the opposite, i.e. an expansion of 
governments power to the detriment of individual liberty. 
Also, it shall not be forgotten that the ECHR only provides for civil and 
political rights: what really troubles the Jeffersonians is the expansion of 
economic and social rights by means of federal action, but the idea discussed 
here would not imply any change as far as these rights are concerned. 
Of course, we must not confuse the EU and the ECHR systems: even if 
there is a federal evolution of the former, this does not mean that this 
innovation necessarily reflects on the latter, since the two systems remain 
separate and the ECHR system is made of 20 more countries that are not part 
of the EU. But things may be viewed differently if one considers a future 
change in the relationship between the EU and the ECHR systems: the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR. Such accession is provided for by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,54 recently entered into force55, and will soon be put into 
practice according to the procedures provided for by Protocol No. 8 to the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
Actually, as for Italy, it is true that, even after judgments Nos. 348 and  
349 of 2007, the ECHR is still subordinate to the Constitution in the Italian  
legal system, and that these two judgments have not allowed judges to cease to 
apply laws contrary to the ECHR, without first raising the question of their 
legitimacy to the Constitutional Court; it is also true that some rulings by the 
Corte di Cassazione have clearly ruled out the so called communitarization of 
the ECHR;56 and it is equally true that the ECJ had ruled against the accession 
                                       
54 Art. 1, number 8), that amends Art. 6 of the Treaty on EU; the accession to the ECHR is 
provided for by para. 2 of the newly written Art. 6. 
55 As was mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009. 
56 These rulings are recalled supra, notes 16 and 17. 
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of the EU to the ECHR without a relevant amendment of the Treaty.57 However, 
when accession occurs (in the very near future), the situation may change.58 
The consequences of the accession will go on being analyzed in depth,59 
but some Italian courts60 have already started to say that EU Member States 
(all members of the ECHR, too) have now a heightened obligation to abide by 
the judgments of the ECtHR, since this obligation is now for them an 
obligation under EU law: today, every level of the Community is bound to 
abide by the Convention.61 
In particular, these judgments have explicitly stated that now that the 
ECHR is (about to be) part of the EU law, the ECHR provisions are directly 
applicable in each Member State, therefore judges shall not apply domestic 
laws that violate these provisions. 
Some authoritative views oppose this construction,62 though it seems to 
be bound to gather momentum: but even if it did not, anyway the problem of 
                                       
57 ECJ, Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 28 March 1996. 
58 As confirmed by the second Annual Report (2008) by the Italian government on the 
Enforcement of ECtHR judgments, (available at www.governo.it): If the Treaty of Lisbon 
enters into force, all the provisions of the Convention would become directly applicable in 
the Member States legal systems, with the same status and applicability as EU law () and 
would no longer be subordinate to the constitution, as they are now , because they w ould be 
applied by virtue of Art. 117(1). 
59 For tw o comments previous to the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see M.E. 
Gennusa, La Cedu e lUnione Europea, in M. Cartabia (ed.), supra note 31, at 91; G. 
Zagrebelsky, La prevista adesione dellUnione Europea alla Convenzione europea dei diritti delluomo, 
available at http://www.europeanrights.eu/getFile.php?name=public/commenti/Adesi 
one_Zagrabelski.doc. Very recently, see also M.G. Bernardini, LEuropa dopo Lisbona: cosa 
cambia?, in www.federalismi.it (2010, No. 11). 
60 Consiglio di Stato, Section IV, judgment of 2 March 2010, No. 1220; TAR Lazio, Section II 
bis, judgment of 18 May 2010, No. 11984, both available at www.giustizia-amministrativa.it. 
61 About this issue, see A. Ruggeri, Ancora in tema di rapporti tra CEDU e Costituzione: profili 
teorici e questioni pratiche, 39 Politica del Diritto 443, 452 (2008): the author observes that the 
EU law can be the vehicle of the Convention. To be sure, some authors think that Italy is 
already bound to the full enforcement of ECtHR judgments: Ubertis, Conformarsi alle 
condanne europee per violazione dellequità processuale: doveroso e già possibile, 3 
Corriere del Merito (2007) 595. 
62 A. Celotto, Il Trattato di Lisbona ha reso la CEDU direttamente applicabile nellordinamento 
italiano? (in margine alla sentenza n. 1220/2010 del Consiglio di Stato), in neldiritto.it, No. 
49 (2010). But see the response by R. Sestini, Il Trattato di Lisbona ha reso la CEDU 
direttamente applicabile nellordinamento italiano?, In margine del Prof. Alfonso Celotto sulla sentenza n. 
1220/2010 del Consiglio di Stato, in www.giustamm.it (June 2010). 
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the effect of ECtHRs judgments will not be able to be kept out of the 
legislative agenda for much longer. When Italy finally decides to amend the 
law currently in force, nothing prevents it from choosing to follow the 
approach we have described. In fact, this seems to be by far the best solution. 
In conclusion, maybe it is still going to take a long time, with a lot of 
going forward and going back; but whether Europe becomes a federal polity 
or not,63 there are strong reasons to think that the solution argued for here 
would be a good choice. So lets put it into effect now. 
                                       
63 In 2003, Valéry Giscard dEstaing, Jean-Luc Dehaene and Giuliano Amato tried to do 
something similar just to what Hamilton, Madison and Jay had done between 1787 and 
1788, trying to persuade European states to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. As is well-
known, the outcome w as quite different. 
